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Abstract
The Inefficiencies and Inequities Associated with Decline
Some New Options for Improving Education in Latin America
The 1980s have been years of great economic difficulty, falling
real per capita income, and a level of debt that now is larger rela-
tive to the new lower per capita incomes in most of Latin America and
Africa. In the nine Latin American countries studied in depth (i.e.,
Brazil, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Chile, Venezuela,
El Salvador, Argentina, and Bolivia), this has generally been asso-
ciated with falling real expenditure per capita on education, deter-
iorating quality (as evidenced by falling test scores), and lower
efficiency as the more cost effective inputs are cut more severely
(e.g., textbook budgets). Although there has been some economic re-
covery in some of the countries, the serious inflation rates in Brazil,
Bolivia, and Argentina do not bode well for recovery soon. The evi-
dence also suggests that there are adverse effects on equity during
decline, with larger percentage cuts in education budgets for the
poor, and larger increases in drop-out rates in poor areas.
Policy options discussed include using the specific prototype
school aid formula presented here to provide stronger incentives for
efficiency and equity, and increasing resource recovery in higher
education together with use of the current means-testing methodology
described here to avoid driving out the promising students from the
lower income families.

The Inefficiencies and Inequities Associated with Decline:
Some New Options for Improving Education in Latin America
Walter W. McMahon
The 1980s have been years of great economic difficulty and falling
real per capita income in most of the nine Latin American countries
studied in this paper, countries within which in-depth education sec-
tor reviews have recently been conducted by the World Bank. Only re-
cently recovery has begun to occur in some of those countries. But
inflation rates are well over 300 percent in Brazil, Bolivia, and
Argentina, which does not bode well for continuing recovery, and all
countries but Brazil remain considerably below their 1980 real per
capita income levels.
This economic decline has been associated with even larger de-
creases in per student real education funding. What limited evidence
there is suggests that this falling real expenditure per student tends
to be associated with a decline in quality, with falling test scores
(after a lag), and with higher drop outs. Since there are incentives
to maintain enrollments both from population pressure as the number of
children continues to grow, and from funding that is tied but only in
part to the level of enrollments, enrollments do not fall, at least at
first. Again the evidence is limited, but in some countries in Latin
America and in 13 out of 39 countries in Africa for which data is
available in Gallagher and Ogbu (1989) (only two of which were pre-
occupied with war activities), enrollment as a percent of the number
of children in each age group has begun to fall. With recovery
beginning to occur in some of the Latin American countries, and the
number of school age children continuing to grow, there is no evidence
that aggregate enrollments are falling. But there is some evidence
that aggregate enrollments would eventually fall if the decline were
severe and protracted, as they are doing currently in Mali and
Somalia.
However it is a matter of serious concern in Latin America that
the reduction in the quality of education, decline in pupil achieve-
ment, and slower or stagnating improvement in enrollment ratios has
adverse implications for economic development. Reductions in educa-
tional quality can have undesirable labor market effects by reducing
the supply of labor qualified to participate in a modernizing economy,
and thereby lower overall economic efficiency. The higher drop-out
rates among the poor, and the larger decline in enrollment ratios in
poor rural and urban areas than in high income suburbs limits the
future earning capacity of the children of the poor more dispropor-
tionately. This effect increases inequity, which is already a serious
problem in several of these Latin American nations, and it also tends
to increase the inequality of earnings in the next and future genera-
tions.
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Until the major factors forcing education to make do with less are
reversed, the best hope is to take steps to maintain or to improve
efficiency and equity in order to minimize the decline in educational
quality, and to minimize the adverse impact on the poor. This
involves considering the dynamic impact of education budget cuts on
efficiency and equity in education in Latin America, as well as some
new policy options set out in sufficiently specific terras for effective
action. It uniquely involves looking at the dynamics of the process
—
i.e., what typically is cut first, second, and last—and given what is
known about the cost effectiveness of each type of input, inquiring
into the implications of this for efficiency, as well as for equity.
In Part I, the pattern that emerges in these nine Latin American
countries will be developed. It will stress the economic forces
driving the decline in education budgets and in quality, especially
falling real per capita income combined with larger numbers of school
age children as the result of population growth, and the implications
for efficiency in education. The pattern will be compared to world-
wide patterns of educational expansion, and decline, in high, middle,
and low-income countries. It will also be considered in light of what
patterns have been found in various African and Asian nations in which
education sector reviews have been done.
In Part II, the implications of the decline in per student re-
sources for equity in education in these Latin American countries will
be developed. Although attention is given to the rates of change and
what can be done to minimizing damage in this context, there are
important basic continuing sources of inequity that must be con-
sidered.
In Part III, the focus is on major issues and policy options.
There is analysis of several things that seem to work better in two or
three of the countries.
The remaining Parts IV and V focus on specific things that can
be done. Their common theme is improving the incentives that exist
for achieving efficiency and pupil-equity within education. Part IV
considers the way educational systems are financed— the sources of
perverse incentives in the way school-aid is distributed by the cen-
tral government (or the provinces) that contribute to high drop-out
rates and other sources of internal inefficiency and inequity. A
specific prototype tool is suggested in the form of an objective
model school-aid formula . It could be refined, adapted to the
situation in each nation, and promoted by the Bank as a means of
strengthening the internal incentives for efficiency, and incentives
for decentralization in financing and decision making, while also
providing for pupil-equity. Part IV also focuses on the Incentives
internal to each school district, in this case for improving the cost
effectiveness by choosing a more efficient input mix. The incentives
for greater equity are also considered, such as the possibility of
making World Bank sector loans conditional on measured progress in
poor areas. Part V summarizes the conclusions and the major policy
options.
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I. The Current Challenge
There are several key patterns emerging as the result of basic
economic and demographic forces throughout South and Central Ajnerica
that are evident in the nine Latin American countries studied.
Key Patterns: An Overview
The basic patterns are the decline in per capita income in the
period since 1980 in all of the countries except Brazil, as shown in
the first column of Table 1. This is known to be a major factor
giving rise to sharp reductions in the real expenditure per capita on
education (see McMahon (1989a) and Gallagher and Ogbu (1989, p. 24)
that is shown in Col. 7 of Table 2). When this is combined with
sustained and moderately high rates of population growth as shown in
Table 1 , this leads to more school age children and continuing
pressure on enrollments. Given this decline in per capita and per
pupil expenditure, what evidence there is suggests that the things cut
first tend to be those things that are most cuttable, such as text-
books and teaching materials (as will be shown later in Table 7) which
are relatively cost effective. The tendency then is for test scores
to decline (Tables 3-5) and drop-out rates to increase (Table 8).
Finally, education in the poorest neighborhoods and rural areas where
schools are least able to sustain themselves tends to be cut by dis-
proportionately large amounts, as shown in Table 8. The result is
deteriorating efficiency, falling quality and increasing inequity.
The Real Per Capital Income Decline
Specifically in Table 1 it can be seen that since 1980 real per
capita income has risen by only .5% per year in Brazil (as compared
to 1.9% in the 19 industrial economies), and has fallen in all of the
other Latin American countries studied. Ranked from the best per-
formance to the largest decline in real per capita income since 1980,
the percent decline in real GDP for Costa Rica is -1.1% per year,
Dominican Republic -1.3%, Jamaica -1.5%, Chile -1.7%, Venezuela -2.0%,
El Salvador -2.2%, Argentina -2.4%, and Bolivia -5.7% per year.
There has been some recovery in 1986-89 in all of these countries,
with the exception that recovery was delayed in Bolivia and disrupted
in El Salvador. But several negative or zero real per capita growth
rates continue, and inflation rates remain disastrously high in Brazil
(157% for 1980-86 and over 700% recently), Argentina (326% and higher
recently), and Bolivia (683%). This suggests that more "structural
adjustment," rising unemployment and falling real per capita income is
yet to follow in these three major countries.
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Table 1
Factors Driving Educational Decline
in Latin America*
Brazil
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Jamaica
Chile
Venezuela
El Salvador
Argentina
Bolivia
High Income Economies
Middle Income Economies
World's 6 Fastest
Growing Countries**
Average Annual
Real Per Capita Average Annual
Income Growth Population
1980-86
Growth
1980-86 1965-86 1981-87
.5% 4.3% 2.2% 2.2%
-1.1 1.6 2.4 2.9
-1.3 2.5 2.4 2.4
-1.5 -1.4 1.5 1.4
-1.7 -.2 1.7 1.7
-2.0 .4 2.9 2.8
-2.2 -.3 1.2 1.2
-2.4 .2 1.6 1.4
-5.7 -.4 2.7 2.7
1.9% 2.3% .6%
0% 2.6% 2.3%
5.4% 6.2% 1.8%
*Source: World Development Report, 1988.
**These are South Korea (6.8%), Hong Kong (4.8%), Singapore (4.2%),
Japan (3.0%), Cameroon (5.0%), and Botswana (8.4% per year since
1980).
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Population and Enrollment Growth
Population growth rates are highest in Bolivia (2.7%) and
Venezuela (2.9%), as compared to much lower rates in the world's
fastest growing countries (1.8%) and in the industrial countries
(.6%) as shown in Table 1. These rates tend to fall as larger per-
centages of women complete education through 9th grade, which gives
them economic options in the labor force other than work in agri-
culture and the rearing of children, and tends to be associated with
lower fertility rates (for evidence see McMahon, 1989b).
The basic model and empirical evidence on rising per capita real
income and growing numbers of children as key determinants of school
expansion, and the reverse with decline, are developed in McMahon
(1989a). The pattern has been falling expenditures per pupil but
rising numbers of children in these nine Latin American countries,
leading to growing enrollments but falling expenditure per pupil and
declining quality . This is part of the broader worldwide pattern
among the lower income countries, since T. Paul Schultz (1988) has
estimated that the per capita real expenditure on education has fallen
from 1972-81 by 67% in a larger set of 39 lowest income countries
(Bolivia is the lowest in our set of nine), and grown only 22% in the
lower middle income countries. On the other hand, expenditure per
pupil has grown 140% and 87% in the upper middle and high income
countries, respectively (op. cit., pp. 551, 555).
Declines in Expenditure Per Pupil
Specifically, in the nine Latin American countries studied, edu-
cation expenditure as a percent of GDP fell from 1980 to 1987 in all
countries for which there is data except for Brazil, as shown in
Table 2. However, the overall level of education expenditure in
Brazil was the lowest in 1980 (2.96% of GDP) of all of these coun-
tries, far below the 6.6% of GDP spent in Costa Rica, the 6.8% in
Jamaica, or the 5.0% in Venezuela. Following the replacement of the
conservative military dictatorship in Brazil in 1985 with an elected
government, Federal real per capita expenditures rose by 33%, or up to
about 4% of GDP which is still well below other countries comparable
per capita incomes.
The three countries suffering the largest decline in real per
capita income are El Salvador, Argentina, and Bolivia shown at the
bottom of Table 2. These are also the countries that had the largest
percentage declines in real expenditure per capita on education,
declines of -47%, -71%, and -37% from 1980 to 1985. These declines
are continuing from 1985-1987 in El Salvador (-22%) and Bolivia
(-28%), and although more rece-nt data is lacking for Argentina, the
extremely high inflation rates there currently and the economic dis-
tress do not bode well for education there.
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Table 2
Real Expenditure Per Capita on Education, 1980-1988
Countries Ranked
By 1980-86 Growth
Rate, High to Lowest
Brazil
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Jamaica
Chile
Venezuela
El Salvador
Argentina
Bolivia
Average 9 LAC's
As a Percent Real Per Capita Percent Change i
of GDP Exp.
(4)
1986 US
(5)
$
(6)
Per Cap
(7)
>ita Exp.
(1) (2) (3) (8)
1980 1985 1988 1980 1985 1987 1980-85 1985-8
2.96 b 3.11 71 +10% +33% e
6.60 5.00 4.90e 146 c 99 98 -32% -1%
Na Na Na Na Na Na — —
6.80 4.80 6.00 118 77 102 -34% +32%
3.52 3.91 3.06 e 79 80 67 +1% -16%
5.00 5.90 — 242 234 — -3% —
4.93 3.12 2.44 e 51 27 21 -47% -22%
4.02 1.65 — 151 43 — -71% —
4.10 3.30 2.80 40 25 18 -37% -28%
a. Source: Patricio Marquez, Summary Data Base, June 1989, Table 10.
b. Estimate based on 1983 Education Exp. and on 1980-84 trend in Health Exp.
c. Estimate based on 1975 data.
d. For Brazil, Percent Change 1980-85 is for real Federal expenditure per
capita only. From Brazil Report, Vol. 2, Table 7a, p. 39. The +33% in
the last column is for real Federal expenditure per capita from 1985 to
1986.
e. 1987.
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Box 1
Jamaica: An Illustration of the Dynamic Process
and Its Effects on Education, Efficiency, and Equity
Jamaica offers an example of this pattern. With real GDP growing
steadily from 1966 through 1974, and primary education already universal,
secondary school enrollment ratios grew from 46% to 60% in 1979. See
Jamaica Report (1988, pp. 37-8). With a larger percentage of females
completing ninth grade, total fertility rates fell from 6.1 in 1966 to
3.7 in 1979, and have continued to fall to 2.8% in 1985.
But from 1974 through 1985, total real income fell by 32%, and
real income per capita fell even further, with only a modest recovery
beginning in 1986 (op. cit., p. 37). After a lag, real expenditures on
education were cut by 31.7% from 1981 through 1985. Although expendi-
tures per pupil have recovered somewhat from 1986-1988, the quality of
education which has been a continuing problem in Jamaica deteriorated
further during and following the decline. School supplies and the
percent of the budget spent on texts were cut, in spite of the fact
that most children lacked full-time use of texts until 1984. Mainten-
ance was curtailed, and overcrowding, sewage, and vandalism problems
grew (see Jamaica Report (1988, p. 22)). Limited but persuasive evi-
dence from 1982 indicates that a large proportion of students who com-
plete grade 6, perhaps as high as 50%, are functionally illiterate.
Enrollment ratios at the secondary level, finally, declined from 1981
through 1983 from 61% to 58% (op. cit., p. 38).
Jamaica has now reduced the proportion of its education budget
going to higher education (from 21.6% to 19.7%), using greater cost
recovery in higher education, and provided tuition and fee waivers for
lower income college students. But in spite of these important steps,
there has been a considerable deterioration of primary education and
other basic services available to the lower income population (op.
cit.
,
p. 1)
.
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Declining Quality
The evidence based on several indicators for the Latin American
countries studied indicates that the quality of education is low,
especially in the lowest income countries, and also suggest that it
has declined in the 1980s.
Quality can be low or decline either because at given levels of
efficiency in the use of inputs, real expenditure per pupil is low,
or falling so that there are fewer inputs, or because inputs are used
in inefficient proportions and wastefully. The evidence although
unsystematic and scattered is that low and falling expenditure per
pupil, and inefficient use of inputs are both contributing to the
lower quality of education in these Latin American countries.
Quality Indicators . Since the development of cognitive compe-
tencies in basic literacy and numeracy skills, in reading and problem
solving skills, and in knowledge of the more important applied areas
are key goals of education in most of these countries, achievement
test scores in the basic areas of math, language, natural sciences,
and social sciences are one very important indicator of the quality of
output of the educational process.
As shown in Table 3, these achievement test scores can be seen to
be positively correlated with per capita income across countries, and
hence with per capita and per pupil expenditure on education. (Expen-
diture per pupil has an income elasticity of about 1.0 in the U.S., as
shown in McMahon (1989) and about 1.4 to 1.6 across these low and
middle income countries as estimated by T. Paul Schultz (1988, p. 555).
So the income level of the country is highly correlated with expendi-
ture per pupil). In the low middle and low income countries, math
scores are 25% lower, reading comprehension scores are 37% lower, and
science scores are 30-33% lower. The only exception is in China, a
low income country where at the secondary level schools are very
selective, science scores are only 2% lower than in the high income
countries, and 6% higher than in the U.S.
This same pattern can be observed in those Latin American coun-
tries for which test scores data are available, although there are
some exceptions to the pattern. It is where these exceptions occur
that differences in efficiency in the use of resources in education
may be able to explain the deviations. The highest achievement by
this index is in Brazil and Argentina, which are also the highest per
capita income countries. Expenditure per capita on education was
lower in Brazil ($65) than Argentina ($103), and science scores were
higher. The military dictatorship that had been in power in Brazil
for many years prior to the election in 1984 held expenditure on basic
education low, but heavily stressed science and technology, which may
explain both the lower expenditure per capita and the higher test
scores in science there.
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Table 3
Quality Indicators: Achievement Test Scores
(Number of Countries for Which Data is Available in Parentheses)
Math Reading Science Science Science
Countries Grade 8 Grade 6 Grades 4-6 Grade 6 Grades 8-10
High Income
,
High Per
Pupil Expenditure .86 (13) .94 (9) .89 (10) .90 (11) .83 (11)
Upper Middle Income .89 (3) .77 (3) .82 (6) .66 (3) .83 (6)
Lower Middle and Low
Income Countries
,
Low Expenditure
per Pupil .64 (3) .59 (2) .56 (2) .68 (3) .65 (5) a
a. Excludes China
Source : Livingstone (1985), Heyneman (1980), and Unpublished International
Evaluation Association data.
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The quality as indicated by these science test scores appears to
be lower in Chile, El Salvador, and Bolivia. But given the amount
spent, the data suggest that the educational system in Chile is rela-
tively less efficient, and the educational system in Bolivia is rela-
tively more efficient per dollar spent. There is no systematic test
score data in Jamaica, a country below Chile and above El Salvador in
GNP per capita and in expenditure per capita on education. But only
about one-half of those finishing nine years of basic education acquire
fundamental literacy, reflecting long-standing problems with quality
there. (See Jamaica, 1988.) Many qualifications must be added, of
course, for the international conversion rates used for the currencies
and the representativeness of the national test scores. But given the
pattern in the broader set of countries, the pattern here and the
deviations from the pattern related to efficiency are suggestive.
Trends in test scores as an indicator of quality would be expected
to fall from 1980 to the present in light of the reduction in inputs
(such as textbooks, loss of the more able teachers, and reduction in
time on task associated with falling expenditure per pupil, Table 2)
and also due to lower efficiency discussed below. Little data is
available on test score trends in these Latin American countries
(which should be made a high priority item in all future Education
Sector Reviews). Table 5, however, reports trends in test scores in
Chile from 1984 to 1988, as well as trends in test scores in several
African countries that have also been experiencing falling expenditure
per pupil on education. The latter were collected very recently by
Gallagher and Ogbu (1989) with some assistance by McMahon, and add
additional insights and a broader perspective on the underlying process
which is the main subject of this discussion.
In Chile where real per capita expenditure on education fell by
16% from 1985 through 1987 (and a major decentralization of education
to municipalities accompanied by increased privatization occurred),
test scores in math, Spanish, natural sciences, and social sciences
fell universally in public and in private subsidized schools alike.
The fact that all test scores fell and by approximately the same
amounts is more significant than the fact that test scores fell
slightly less in all subjects except the social sciences in the
private subsidized schools because it is not known whether or not
parents of some of the better students were tending to withdraw their
children from the public municipal schools and transfer them to the
private nonsubsidized schools (not shown) and/or to the private sub-
sidized schools. There is no comparative test score data for any of
the other Latin American countries studied, a fact that is extremely
unfortunate, especially for El Salvador, Bolivia, and Argentina where
per capita expenditure cuts from 1980-85 were larger (-47%, -37%, and
-71%, respectively) and are continuing.
In Africa, however, a similar pattern can be observed. Again it
is unsystematic, because the data is so sparse, but nevertheless sug-
gestive. Those countries for which consistent and current data exist,
however, are shown in Table 5. They must be interpreted with caution
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Table 4
Quality of Education (Achievement) and Expenditure
Per Capita in Latin America, 1980
Exp. Exp. Per Mean Test
Country
GDP Per
Capita 1981 a
Educ. as %
of GDP, 1980b
Capita on
^ . . cEducation
Scores
in Science*
Argentina 2,560 4.02% 103 28.8
Brazil 2,220 2.96 65 33.0
Chile 2,560 3.52 90 20.8
El Salvadior 650 4.93 32 20.8
Bolivia 600 4.10 24 24.8
Sources: a. World Bank, WDR, 1983.
b. Patricio Marquez, Summary Data, Table 10.
c. Col. 1 times Col. 2.
d. Heyneman and Laxley (1983, p. 1162;).
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Table 5
Trends in Quality as Indicated by Test Scores
Percent Passing
Chile a
Mathb
Spanish"
Natural Sciences
Social Sciences
Public
Municipal Schools
1984
53.4
59.6
56.8
63.3
1988
50.6
53.0
50.2
54.3
Private
Subsidized Schools
1984
58.3
64.8
62.0
67.6
1988
55.8
59.7
55.3
58.2
Test Scores
% Change
1984-88
Pub. Pvt.
•11
12
14
-4.3%
-8
-11
-14
Africa
Burkino Faso
1976
Test
Scores
1985
%
Pass
Test
Scores
1987
%
Pass
Test
Scores
Test Scores
% Change
1976-87
Primary
Secondary
Vocational
University
Senegal
50
60
36
54
1976
(33)
42
52
35
34
(24)
40
45
35<
26
-20%
-25
-52
Primary
Secondary
Botswana
Primary
Secondary
46.2
57.7
% Pass
(72)
(52)
(72)
(66)
43
61
42 -9
63 +8
% Pass
Percentage
Point Change
NA
(83) +14
Sources : a. Chile Report, The World Bank (1987, p. 31).
b. Corrected to be comparable to the 1984 scores essentially
by removing rural areas that were not in the 1984 sample.
This correction is not available for the Natural and
Social Science scores.
c. Gallagher and Ogbu (1989, p. 80) for Test Scores, and
(op. cit., p. 78) for % Pass. Ethiopia was omitted
because of the unusual conditions of war and famine
there.
d. Average of 1983-87 since 1986 appears to be an outlier.
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because they are affected by the percent of each age cohort that is
enrolled, and by the selection process that affects who takes the
test.
In Burkino Faso, which has been increasing the percent of its
budget that it spends on education toward the relatively high current
19%, real per capita income has fallen by -.3% per year. But re-
sources have been shifted away from secondary education toward higher
education. And in secondary education, with this and with the
expansion of enrollments, test scores have fallen 25 to 52%, at least
in the short run. Teachers' salaries had crept up to 98% of the
recurrent basic education expenditure budget by 1987, following large
cuts in expenditure on textbooks and supplies, building maintenance,
and construction. (See Gallagher and Ogbu, 1989, pp. 52-53 and Table
5.) It is possible that this is an example of a place where the
resource mix has become relatively inefficient, as will be discussed
farther below.
In Senegal, real expenditure on education has declined slightly
from 1978 through 1987, so that with a 2.9% population growth rate,
average expenditure per pupil has declined even more sharply (op.
cit., p. 52). (Real income per capita fell by -.6%/year from 1965
through 1986.) Primary test scores declined by 9%. But at the
secondary level, a new pre-test was added that screened out a number
who otherwise would have taken the national baccalaureate exam,
producing a somewhat artificial 9% increase in average test scores at
the secondary level.
Botswana is the fastest growing country in Africa, with real GDP
growing at 8.3% per year since 1965 and 8.9% for the later 1980-87
part of the period. (See World Bank, WDR, 1987, pp. 202-3 and 254.)
It is one of the six fastest growing countries in the world, and
spends a relatively high 18.7% of its national budget on education.
This is typical of the other fast growing countries (e.g., Singapore
20.2%, South Korea 18.4%), and similar to only Venezuela (17.7%) and
Costa Rica (19.4%) among the nine Latin American countries studied
here. (Op. cit., p. 247.) Its expenditure per pupil at both primary
and secondary levels grew faster than any of the other African or
Latin American countries studied, and in this dynamic context, with
both per capita incomes and teachers' salaries rising, teachers'
salaries as a percent of recurrent expenditure fell from 54% in 1975
to 42% in 1984. (See Gallagher and Ogbu, 1989, p. 53.) Only 52% of
the secondary school graduates passed the internationally standardized
Cambridge exams in 1976, but by 1987 this percentage had jumped to
83%, and the proportion who obtained a grade 1 score has tripled
since 1975. It is possible to conclude that in this case the efforts
of the government to improve quality both by providing more resources
and by improving efficiency in the input mix have been paying off.
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Declining Efficiency
The kinds of improvements in quality associated with rising real
expenditure per pupil and an increasingly efficient input mix such as
that found in stable gradually expanding systems may not be possible
during phases of economic decline affecting education such as that
found in at least eight out of the nine Latin American countries
studied. The shocking fact appears to be that not only does quality
decline as expenditures per pupil and hence the quantity and quality
of the inputs fall, but also efficiency is reduced . Declining effi-
ciency then would logically act as an additional source of reductions
in the quality (and quantity) of outputs.
The evidence relates to the effect of declining real expenditure
per pupil on changes in the input mix, on the percent repeating, on
the percent dropping out, and on time-on-task.
The Input-Mix . Internal ("X") efficiency is composed of technical
efficiency (i.e., "getting down to the isoquant" from X to Y in
Figure 1) which depends primarily on utilizing the best techniques
suggested by learning theory, and price efficiency (i.e., moving along
the isoquant from Y to E) until the most efficient "mix" between
teaching materials, teachers' time, building maintenance, and other
inputs is achieved. Economic efficiency (at E) requires the attain-
ment of both technical efficiency and price efficiency. What follows
first considers price efficiency
,
or the typical effects of economic
decline on the "mix" of teaching materials, teachers' time, and other
educational inputs.
Education in countries where labor is cheaper relative to capital,
as it is in Bolivia for example, tends to be more labor intensive
(e.g., with price ratios ^\B\ at E) than in industrialized countries
like the U.S. or Japan where labor is more expensive and the services
of capital goods are cheaper (e.g. , with price ratios given by U^Ui
at Z). Teachers' salaries as a percent of the total education budgets
therefore should be expected to be a larger percent of the budget in
the lower income countries if the education system is to be efficient.
This pattern is evident in Bolivia and Jamaica, the only two
countries for which such data is available in the World Bank Education
and social sector reviews. Texts and materials, which are known to be
relatively cost effective (see the survey of research on this by
Fuller, 1987) are a very small .1% to 4% of education expenditures in
Bolivia and Jamaica, compared to a much larger 10-19% of the education
budgets in the U.S. and Japan. (See Table 6.)
Part of these low ratios are associated however with the 37% and
34% cuts in expenditure per capita on education from 1980 to 1985 in
Bolivia and Jamaica, followed by a further 28% cut in Bolivia from
1985 to 1988. (See Table 2.) The hypothesis is that the things that
get cut first are those things that are most easily "cuttable," not
necessarily those things that are less cost effective. For example,
-15-
(Teaching
Materials
,
Services
of Capital
Goods)
Other Inputs
A
U.S. -
Bolivia
4
Teaching
Materials;
etc.
Teachers
Figure 1
Internal Efficiency in Education
-16-
Table 6
Percent of Education Budgets Spent on Each Major Input
Japan U.S. Jamaica Bolivia
1987 1987 1983 1987
19% 10% 4% .1%
48% 51% 70%
8% 8% 11%
Texts and Materials
Teachers' Salaries
Administrators' Salaries
Teachers & Administrators'
Salaries 56% 59% 91% 98.1%
Source: Jamaica (1988), Bolivia (1989b).
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construction, building maintenance, textbooks, and teaching materials
seem to be cut first, and with both enrollment and enrollment ratios
continuing to increase, teachers are not laid off, at least at first.
But their salaries fall in real terms given the high inflation
rates, teachers moonlight as in El Salvador (1989, p. 2) and Bolivia
(1989) working only half days in the public system, attrition of
teachers occurs, pupil drop-out rates increase (see below), and quality
deteriorates. Class size increases, and as budget cuts become more
severe, teachers are laid off. Administrators however tend to be
retained.
The data is not systematic enough for these nine Latin American
nations in the sector reviews being considered her to test this
dynamic-sequencing hypothesis adequately. But the pattern can be ob-
served in Costa Rica, El Salvador, and in the four countries in
Africa' from which consistent data was collected.
In Costa Rica, where per capita income fell but at a relatively
modest -1.1%/year from 1980-86, real expenditures per capita on educa-
tion fell by 32% (Tables 1 and 2). Capital expenditures in education
fell more sharply, as would be expected typically throughout both the
public and private sectors, falling 72% in current price terms (Table
7) and moving from 26.8% of total expenditures on education in 1980
to 7.5% of total expenditures in 1987 (see Costa Rica, 1989, p. 6).
Enrollment continued to grow, especially at the secondary level with
39.1% of the children at that age enrolled in 1982 and 44.4% in 1986.
Real expenditure per student fell much more sharply at the primary
(-42%) and secondary (-37 to -39%) levels than at the higher education
level (-24%) (see Table 7), which suggests that equity was adversely
affected since higher education benefits primarily the higher income
families. With growing enrollments and much lower expenditure per
pupil at the primary and secondary levels, and expenditures on teaching
materials, equipment, and maintenance falling to less than 1% of the
budget, quality deteriorated and drop-out rates increased. As shown
in Table 7, the proportion of pupils admitted to the next grade fell 5
percentage points at the primary level (from 90% to 85.6%) and 10 per-
centage points at the secondary level (from 66.2% in 1980 to 54.4% in
1986).
In El Salvador, where the cuts in real per capita expenditure
from 1980-85 were more severe—47% from 1980-85 and have been
followed by a further -22% cut since 1985 (see Table 2)—there has
been a serious deterioration of the educational process. There have
been low levels of investment in new schools, books, and other teach-
ing aids. There has also been large reductions in teachers' salaries
in real terms, with average pay per teacher in 1987 less than half the
1979 level (see El Salvador, 1988, p. 3), although the number of
teachers has continued to grow at 1% per year. Teachers have gone to
half-time work schedules in the public sector, and the great fall in
real wages per hour has produced a weaker involvement of them with
their work. Many have turned to teaching a second terra in the private
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Table 7
Changes in Efficiency and Equity During Decline and Recovery
Percent Change Percent Change
1980-1984 1985-1987
Costa Rica
1. Current Expenditure, Current
Prices 3 +23% +2.4%
Capital Expenditure, Current
Prices -72% 7%
2. Expenditure Per Student, in
Real Terms:
Primary -42% +12%
Secondary General -37% +18%
Secondary Technical -39% +26%
Higher -24% +18%
3. Percentage Point Change in
Proportion of Pupils Admitted
to Next Grade:
Primary -5 -.3
Secondary -10 -2.2
A* A bAfrica
1
.
Burkino Faso
Real Salaries 8.6% 9.5%
Textbooks & Supplies -11.7% -38.9%
2. Cameroons
Real Salaries 11.8% 4.4%
Textbooks & Supplies 9.8% 2.5%
3. Ethopia
Real Salaries
Textbooks & Supplies
4. Senegal
Real Salaries 10.0% -.3%
Textbooks & Supplies -4.1% -3.4%
Sources : a. Computed from Costa Rica (1989), (1) from Table 3, p. 6,
(2) Table 5, p. 10, (3) Table 4, p. 8.
b. Gallagher & Ogbu (1989, Table III. 2, p. 52).
c. 1980-87 and 1987-88.
.
.7
.
.
12,,1
6,.6
,.0
,.1
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urban schools, which have been growing rapidly in the higher income
suburbs. (See El Salvador, 1988, p. 4.) The deterioration in quality
(and efficiency) is reflected in the increase in drop-out rates shown
in Table 8. The drop-out rates are enormous in the rural areas, 21%
per year during grades 1 to 3 and averaging 32% per year of those
students remaining during grades 4-6. The evidence is that the cuts
during 1978-86 of 56.8% in expenditure per capita had more adverse
effects in the rural areas.
This means a decline in the percent of pupils finishing primary
school. El Salvador has a very low completion rate (11.7% in Table
8), and the increase in drop-out rates lowers it about .8 of a per-
centage point further. Costa Rica's high 74.9% completion rate would
be lowered to about 70%. The direction of the effect on primary
school completion rates in all of the other Latin American countries
studied is expected to be similar, although the precise magnitude of
these trends from 1980 to 1985 to 1989* cannot be known until such
time as this specific data is collected.
II. Are Equity Objectives Served in the
Financing of Education?
It is important to consider not just the adverse effects on
quality and efficiency of education in Latin America in the last
decade, but also the effects on the equity with which education and
other social services are distributed within the population. Educa-
tion (and health) differ from most other social services in that
their distribution is a distribution of investment in the future among
young children that enables their participation in the labor force and
a wider distribution of earnings later. The inequality in the way
education is distributed currently in these nations as between urban
and rural populations, and as between high and low income families, as
will be developed below, perpetuates inequality in the income
distribution in future generations. When budget cuts in education and
health bear disproportionately on the poor, this then can exacerbate
the inequality later and can lead to an increasingly volatile polit-
ical situation.
The degree of inequality in the income distribution shown in Table
9 can be seen to be greatest in Brazil. 66.6% of the income there
goes to the top 20% of the population. This is higher than any other
Latin American country in this study, much higher inequality than in
the three fastest growing countries in the world, and much higher than
in any of the major industrial economies as can be seen in Table 9.
The poorest 20% of the population in Brazil receives only 2% of the
income. This is less than in any other Latin American country, and
far less than the proportion of income received by the poor in the
three fastest growing countries or than in the industrial economies.
Of the other countries studied, inequality is highest in Venezuela and
Costa Rica, and lowest in El Salvador, although data are not avail-
able for Jamaica, Dominican Republic, and Bolivia.
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Table 8
Efficiency Levels and Changes in Efficiency
Percentage Change
1978-1986
El Salvador
Real Expenditure Per Capita 58.8%
Drop-Out Rates (Per Year)
Grades 1-3
Grades 4-6
Grades 7-9
Percent Finishing Primary School, 1980 ° Estimated Change 1980-1986
1986 Level
Rural
Percentage Point Change
Urban Urban Rural
5% 21% -6 + .3
9% 32% +5 +4
6% 16% + .3 +3
El Salvador 11.7%
Brazil 36.4%
Venezuela 67.5%
Costa Rica 74.9%
Jamaica 79.5%
-.8 (from above)
-5 (Table 7)
Sources : a. Patricio Marquez Summary Data, Table 11, for 1980-87
b. Computed from El Salvador (1988, Table 22).
c. UNESCO (1984).
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Table 9
Degree of Inequality and Trends in Inequality
in the Income Distribution
Latin American Countries Studied
For Which Data is Available:
Brazil (1972)
Costa Rica (1971)
Chile .
Venezuela (1970)
El Salvador (1977)
Argentina (1970)
Percent of Income
Received by the Growth (Real
Highest Lowest Per Capita)
Quintile Quintile
2.0%
1980-86
66.6% .5%
54.8% 3.3% -1.1%
51.0% 4.0% -1.7%
54.0% 3.0% -2.0%
47.7% 5.8% -2.2%
50.3% 4.4% -2.4%
World's Three Fastest Growing Countries (For Which Income Distribution
Data is Available)
South Korea
Hong Kong
Japan
45.3% 5.7%
47.0% 5.4%
37.5% 8.7%
6.8%
4.8%
3.0%
Sample Industrial Market Economies
Germany (1978)
United Kingdom (1979)
United States
39.5% 7.9%
39.7% 7.0%
39.9% 5.3%
2.5%
1.4%
2.1%
Trends in the Degree of Inequality in the Distribution of Income
Percent of Income Received
Argentina
By Highest 10% in the Income Distribution
By Poorest 40%
El Salvador
By Highest 20%
By Poorest 20%
1974 1985
33% 37%
16% 14%
1977 1985
47.7% 53.6%
5.8% 3%
Sources : World Development Report (1988, pp. 272-3), except for
Chile from Chile (1987), Argentina from Argentina (1988,
p. 1), El Salvador from El Salvador (1989, p. 8).
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Changes over time during the late 1970s and 1980s indicate that
this inequality has increased, both as unemployment and underemploy-
ment increased in the early 1980s and as larger percentage budget
cuts were made in the education in the low income and rural areas than
in the high income urban suburbs. When real income falls in the low
income segments of the population that are already near subsistence,
there is less capacity to support education there, and apparently no
significant increase in the willingness of the higher income groups to
transfer tax funds for subsidies to the poorest areas.
Evidence consistent with this hypothesis for Argentina and El
Salvador shows that the rich got richer and the poor got poorer in
both of these nations from 1974 to 1985. In Bolivia (1989b) the re-
duction in the real income of teachers was associated with a deter-
ioration in the quality, with the percent of teachers who are graduates
of teachers colleges falling from 87% in 1980 to 74% in 1988, with 30%
of the teachers in the low income rural sector internos (i.e., not
qualified), 11% internos in the urban sector, and the shortage of
teachers increasingly acute in the rural sector (op. cit., p. 4).
Although real agriculture wages for farm laborers, the very poorest
group in society, declined, the terras of trade improved for farmers,
especially in those countries that devalued, and agricultural output
as a percent of GDP increased in Brazil and Chile however (see World
Bank (1986, p. 15), Poverty in Latin America: The Impact of Depres-
sion ) .
The main differential effect occurs in education because children
from low income rural and urban families are most heavily dependent
on the public schools. When expenditure per pupil is cut, they are
the ones most directly affected. Higher income neighborhoods are more
able to supplement teachers' salaries and teaching material budgets
with special fees, and as quality falls, to switch their children to
private schools. This effect is illustrated in El Salvador (1989,
p. 3) where private basic education enrollments grew at a 17.4%
annual rate increasing their share of total enrollments while public
school enrollments increased at only 3.1% (op. cit., p. 3) during the
time that real teachers' salaries fell by 1987 to less than half their
1979 level (op. cit., p. 3).
Consistent with this pattern, drop-out rates tend to be highest,
and to increase the most, in the primary schools in the poor dis-
tricts (Argentina, 1988, p. 8). As early as 1981, 26% of the
schools in the poorer districts were on a reduced daily schedule and
accommodating three shifts, compared to 12% in the urban Buenos Aires
area (op. cit., p. 7), and real teachers' salaries fell a further 71%
at the primary level, 58% at the secondary level, and 67% at the
University level from 1980 through 1985 since that time (Argentina,
1988, Table 7.4, p. 96).
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A further differential effect on the poor has occurred in some of
these countries because primary education budgets, from which a larger
percentage of the benefits go to the poor, were cut by larger per-
centage amounts than higher education budgets. The distribution of
public education expenditures by income group is shown in Table 10 for
Argentina. The lowest income group receives 34% of the benefits from
the primary and secondary education budgets, and only 8.3% from higher
education to which they frequently cannot gain access. In contrast,
the highest income 20% gets 38% of the benefits from higher education.
This is typical of the pattern in the other Latin American
countries studied, as is shown in Table 11. For those countries for
which data is available, the situation is most severe in Columbia and
Dominican Republic, where the poorest 40% receive only 6% and 2%,
respectively, of the benefits from higher education, and the richest
20% receive 60-76% of these benefits.
III. Major Issues and Policy Options
There are problems with low and declining levels of quality and
of efficiency in education in these Latin American nations in the
1980s and a failure of many of the central government expenditures
on all levels of education to adequately reach the poor. The two
prior sections have sought to analyze this process, or why this is
occurring. Part III will turn to a normative analysis, or, given the
diagnosis of the problems and the nature of the process, what can be
done about them by means of viable policy options.
To summarize the major conclusions from the positive analysis,
they should be qualified by the fact that the data in the sector re-
views (World Bank 1987-89) is not systematic and is spotty. But con-
clusions regarding the process draw also on an analysis in greater
depth of the forces driving school expansion and decline in McMahon
(1989a). They also draw on more systematic data from other World Bank.
(1988) sources. The major conclusions are that:
1
.
Cuts in real expenditure per pupil are associated with a
decline in quality . At given levels of efficiency, this leads
to less inputs and less time-on-task with adverse effects on
test scores and other quality indicators.
2. Efficiency tends to decline as expenditures per pupil are cut
,
not to increase as some might think, and this effect accel-
erates the decline in quality . Price efficiency declines be-
cause some input prices and some budget categories are more
inflexible than others, with adverse effects on the price
efficiency of the input mix. Technical efficiency also tends
to decline because of adverse effects on teacher motivation,
drop-out rates, repetition rates, and other indicators.
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Table 10
Distribution of Public Education Expenditures by
Income Group, Argentina, 1980
Primary and
Income Qu;int:Lies Secondary
Lowest 34%
2nd 23
3rd 18
4th 14.1
Highest 10.9
Higher
Education
100%
8,.3%
9,,1
17,.5
27,.1
38,.0
All Public
Education
28,.3%
19,.9
17,.9
17,.0
16,.9
100% 100%
Source; Argentina (1988, Table 7.9, p. 101), originally from IEERAL.
Table 11
Who Benefits From Education Subsidies?
Percent of Government Expenditure on
Education Received by Each Income Group
Higher
Poorest
Education
Richest
All Education
Poorest Richest
Country Year
1980
40% 20% 40% 20%
Argentina 17% 38% 48% 17%
Chile 1980 12% 54% 48% 18%
Costa Rica 1980 17% 42% 42% 20%
Dominican Republic 1980 2% 76% 24% 33%
Columbia 1974 6% 60% 40% 21%
Sources; Jiminez (1987), World Bank (1986).
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Equity also tends to suffer, with adverse effects on the poor
that are disproportionately large * This occurs because the
cuts absorbed by primary education from which the poor bene-
fits tend to be higher than those for higher education in most
but not all places. Also, cuts in public education from which
the poor benefit tend to be larger than in those aspects of
private education that are not subsidized and not operated by
the church from which they normally benefit less. The impact
on urban vs. rural expenditure per pupil is very important,
but not readily available and needs further study.
The Economies of Decline: Policies for
Greater Efficiency and Equity
In light of the above, there are four major policy areas that need
to be addressed:
1
.
The Distribution of Spending Among Sectors and
Sub-Sectors is Not Appropriate
More attention needs to be paid to the high social rates of return
to primary and secondary education in most of these countries, e.g.,
23.5% in Brazil, 16.9-24% in Chile, 82-17% in Venezuela. Investment
at these levels needs to increase by larger percentage amounts than
in higher education, where social rates of return are closer to 12 or
13%. (Psacharopoulos , 1985.) To fail to do this is a failure to
seize upon a key means of increasing efficiency in the use of re-
sources.
More attention also needs to be paid to the fact that there is
underinvestment in education in many of these countries in relation to
the level of investment in physical capital. In Brazil particularly,
only 3.11% of GDP was invested in all of education in 1985 (Table 2)
in spite of the fact that the rates of return to be realized from
increased investment in primary education were 23.5%. Aggregate
investment is low also in Chile (3.06% of GDP), in El Salvador (2.44%
of GDP), and in Bolivia (2.8% of GDP) in 1987. If rates of return to
physical capital are 10-11% in real terras in these countries, there
would appear to be overinvestment in physical capital and the dis-
placement of uneducated labor that is the result.
2. The Education Sub-Sectors Do Not Use
Resources Efficiently
As developed above, the cuts in real expenditure per pupil (and
per capita) tend to increase the inefficiency in the use of resources.
It is slow, gradual growth in real expenditure per pupil that appears
to be most conducive to increasing the price efficiency with which
the inputs are combined and used, and equity is improved. Clearly
textbooks and teaching materials, which are known to be cost effective
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(see Fuller, 1987), are cut too far, and administrators, which seem
to be cut only in the last final stages of decline, are not cut far
enough.
However, a more labor intensive (teacher intensive, administrator
intensive) mode of production of education in lower income countries
where capital is relatively much more expensive _ls economically
efficient, and for that reason, should be expected to persist.
Within higher education, there is a vast amount of economic waste
and inefficiency, especially in Brazil, Dominican Republic, and
Bolivia among the countries for which there is data. The tax costs
per student are extremely high, 17 times as high as primary education
in Brazil, and 10 times as high as primary education in Latin America
on the average as compared to only about three times as high as the
tax cost per pupil in the U.S. As can be seen in Table 12, the
industrial countries on the average spend only 19.1% of their education
budgets on higher education, whereas every one of these nine Latin
American countries except Brazil and Argentina are spending a larger
percentage than that. This is so even though a smaller percentage of
their population goes on to college.
The reason for this high cost is first the virtually free tuition
and very low rates of resource recovery as shown in Table 13. Stu-
dents are currently paying about 35% of the institutional costs of
higher education in the U.S., and this amount is rising. But in
Bolivia and Dominican Republic, only 1% of the costs are paid by the
students (Table 13) largely because free tuition (and other stipends)
are provided to students who are largely from high income families.
Chile did raise tuitions in the late 1970s while drastically reducing
the subsidies to the universities (see Chile, 1987, p. 32), thereby
raising the amount of cost recovery to 25% (Table 12). But Chile
failed to introduce a means testing system, and provide tuition and
fee waivers on a more targeted basis to students from low income
families, so by 1985 enrollment fell by 20,000 students and most of
these students from lower income families were driven out.
A second major source of economic inefficiency in the use of
inputs within higher education is the failure to use the more advanced
graduate students as half-time teaching assistants to teach the be-
ginning courses and as half-time research assistants to assist with
research projects at the universities. Without this efficient arrange-
ment, higher education would be so costly in the U.S. that it could
not serve as large a fraction of the college age population. The
diffusion of the technology to undergraduates and to industry is also
greatly aided by not using full-time research assistants but instead
using part-time graduate students who have contact with undergraduates
and who constitute a constant flow of practically experienced and
up-to-date natural scientists, life scientists, and social scientists
into industry and government employments. These are sources of very
major economies that could be used more extensively in Latin America.
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Table 12
Percent of Education Expenditures
Allocated to Each Level
1. Brazil 51% M 14%
2. Costa Rica 40 27% 33
3. Dominican Republic 39 21 22
4. Jamaica 32 35.3 20
5. Chile (1985) 30
6. El Salvador 64 8 27
7. Argentina 43 31 18
8. Bolivia 74.9 13.8 20
9. All LAC's above (1980) 50.9 25.6 23.5
10. Industrial Countries
(1980) 36.6 44.3 19.1
Percent Enrolled
Primary Secondary Higher Secondary
55%
40
30
81
20
27
31
15
48'
93'
Sources : Lines 1-8: Jamaica Staff Appraisal Report, Student Loan
Project, Annex 1.
Lines 9-10: The World Bank. (1986a, Appendix Table 6) and
(for the last column), The World Bank (1988, p. 280).
Notes: 1985
Table 13
Low Cost Recovery in Higher Education
Dominican Republic
Bolivia
Brazil
Costa Rica
Chile
1980
1%
1%
5%
8%
25%
Source : World Bank (1986a, Table 7, p. 55).
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3. The Method of Financing Primary and Secondary
Education Is Not Conducive to Achieving
Either Efficiency or Equity
The method for transferring resources from the central government
to the schools is typically through a series of informal negotiated
agreements, rather than through a more objective public "formula" that
both contains incentives to increase efficiency and provides for equity
by providing a floor or foundation amount per pupil. Whatever trans-
fer system is used constitutes a set of incentives , and many of the
incentives provided are often perverse. The result of a non-objective
formula is leakage, or funds that are drained off, inefficiency in the
form of high drop-out rates, and short school days (since the transfer
mechanism does not provide incentives for knocking on doors, or for
maintaining the length of the school day and school year) , little
incentive for outcome-based instruction, and inequity.
An example of this is in Brazil, where the financing mechanism
consists of a set of opaque and highly politicized agreements called
convenios . Such a system does not equalize expenditure between urban
and rural children, but instead can be used to pay off those who offer
political support, and is open to other abuses.
This financing system is so central to achieving any significant
amount of reform in the efficiency and equity of the primary educa-
tion system in almost all of these Latin American countries that a
"Model School Aid Formula" that contains appropriate incentives has
been developed and will be discussed in detail in Part IV below.
Something more specific of this type that can be promoted by the Bank
is needed, since vague exhortations and isolated financing policies
can both be ineffective.
4. The Administrative and Budget Processes are Not
Adequate for Targeting Education Spending to the
Poor Who Have Been Most Severely Affected by the
Education Budget Cuts and Initially Had the
Greatest Need
The evidence presented in Part II of the great inequality that
exists in these countries, especially Brazil of those studied, and the
perverse incidence of the education budget cuts on the achievement
test scores and access to basic education by the poor offers ample
evidence (although from scattered sources) that the targeting is
inadequate.
In primary and secondary education, introduction and use of a
model school aid formula that contains a floor, or minimal amount of
expenditure per pupil whether in urban or rural areas, high income
neighborhoods or rural slums, is a necessary pre-condition. This
foundation level guaranteed by the central government for each child
in Average Daily Attendance would provide a greater degree of equality
of opportunity.
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Within higher education, the failure to target tuition and fee
waivers, as well as subsistence grants, to the able students from low
income families results in these students merely being driven out of
the system as fees are raised. An example of this is in Chile (1987,
p. 32). When fees were raised in the late 1970s a loan program was
set up. Outlays for universities fell from 40% of the education
budget to 30% by about 1985. This is still high in relation to the
19.1% in the industrial countries (see Table 12) and still high in
relation to the 23.5% in the other Latin American countries (see Table
12). Furthermore in Chile a smaller percentage of the college age
population is enrolled than in the most of the industrial countries.
Given Chile's failure to use a means test to target tuition and fee
waivers to the poor, enrollments fell as was mentioned by 14% from
145,000 college students in 1975 to 125,000 in 1985 as shown at the
bottom of Table 14. Nevertheless, the budget shift in Chile had high
economic returns, since the rate of return to basic education is twice
that for higher education, and the enrollment in basic education
increased substantially. (See Chile, 1987, p. 32 and Table 14.)
The importance of using a means test to target education and
health subsidies, including higher education tuition and fee waivers
is brought out by the greater sensitivity to price increases among the
lower income groups shown at the top of Table 14. In this interesting
study of clinic and hospital use by adults and children, the price
elasticities are four to five times larger for the lowest income
quartile than for the highest income quartile. Furthermore, a very
systematic pattern emerges. The price elasticities are systematically
much larger (in absolute value) in the next to highest income quar-
tile, which is a group that does have some degree of access to the
universities, than in the highest income quartile.
The system for financial need analysis has been highly developed
in the United States. This occurred initially in response to the
desire of Ivy League institutions to not exclude able applicants from
low income families, but later was expanded to provide nationwide
access to higher education at lower total tax cost. The system has
spread to Germany, and most other European countries, and most
especially to South Korea and Japan for the same reasons. It has
great potential for much more extensive use in the Latin American
countries, and therefore will be developed in more specific terms as a
prototype tool in Part V below.
IV. Incentives for Greater Efficiency and Equity
in a Model School Aid Formula
The method by which financial resources are distributed by the
central government to local schools constitutes a system of educational
grants, or an implicit "school aid formula" that is inherently a set
of incentives . These incentives can be perverse, encouraging inef-
ficiency in the form of high drop out rates and low achievement as
well as making few resources available to poor children in rural
-30-
Table 14
Price Elasticities by Income Level
Medical Services Use
Rural Cote d'lvoire
Hospital Use by Adults
Clinic Use by Adults
Hospital Use by Children
Clinic Use by Children
Highest Lowest
Income Quartile Quartile Income
Quartile 3 2 Quartile
-.17 -.66 -.80 -.95
-.19 -.59 -.65 -.73
-.31 -1.18 -1.38 -1.58
-.31 -.99 -1.12 -1.22
Source; Gertler and Van der Gaag (1988).
Education in Chile
1975 to 1984
Higher Education Basic Education
Percent Change in Subsidy
Percent Change in Enrollment
-25%;
-14% 1
30.4%
+89%'
a. Percentage-point drop from 40 to 30% of MOEC's budget.
b. Student Loan Program was implemented, but no means testing, and
no need-based tuition and fee waivers or grants.
c. Percent increase in real expenditure on primary and secondary from
1979 to 1982.
d. This is percent increase in enrollment in pre-elementary only.
Source: Chile (1987, pp. 32, 87).
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areas, for example. Or they can be positive, generating high per-
formance and a reasonable degree of equity among pupils, as well as
incentives for some decentralization of the financing.
The systems that exist often are perverse, and sometimes non-
objective. In Brazil, as mentioned above, money is passed from higher
levels to the level below through highly politicized informal argu-
ments called convenios . Each successive level keeps their cut, and
there is leakage before the resources ever reach the classroom and
individual pupils. Such systems are inefficient in the use of re-
sources at the most elemental level, not because people are inherently
dishonest, but because the system is susceptible to being used for
payoffs for personal political support, and there are not objective
criteria based on the number of pupils in average daily attendance
that are known to the local school administrator who can determine
whether or not the resources appropriated by the legislative body
actually reach the school. This use of objective published criteria
helps to police the system. Where the systems for distributing funds
contain perverse incentives and/or are nonobjective, little can be
done at the local level to overcome the inefficiencies and pupil
inequities that result.
Except for Brazil, the Latin American sector reviews considered
here do not address the financing of basic education in specific
terras, or deal with how the incentives in education grant criteria
work currently, or could be improved. The problem with exhortation at
too general a level is that when loan recipients lack understanding
what to do, little is done.
What follows seeks to develop in very specific terras a "model
school-aid formula" as a prototype tool. It explains the incentives
that it contains, with the view that it then could be modified,
adapted, and promoted for use in most of these Latin American coun-
tries. The need to make the financial transfer system more objective
is particularly acute in Brazil, where the inequity is greatest and
there is already considerable decentralization of education. But the
problem with high drop-out rates, lack of incentives for teachers to
stress outcome-based instruction, and the problems with inequalities
in the expenditure per pupil permeate all of these Latin American
countries and are widely discussed in the reports.
The Incentives Needed
The system of educational grants to localities needs to contain
incentives for efficiency
,
pupil equity , and decentralization of some
of the responsibility for financing and hence for decision making.
Each needs to be explained briefly, and related to the specific for-
mula that follows shortly.
Efficiency can be increased by incentives in the formula that
encourage attendance, reduce drop-out rates, discourage short school
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day s and too many holidays, and encourage a commitment to student
achievement. This can be done by basing education grants on the num-
ber of pupils in average daily attendance (ADA) , sampled at unannounced
times by representatives of the central Ministry of Education, and
included explicitly in the formula, rather than basing grants on
opening fall enrollments. The latter is the practice currently in
use in many of the Latin American (as well as African and South Asian)
countries. The result is that opening fall enrollments are large,
drop-out rates are very high, and teachers (or headmasters) have no
incentive to "knock on doors." The grants also need to be contingent
on a school day of minimum length and of a minimum number of days in
school per year.
It is a common current practice to set teachers salaries centrally,
as in Bolivia and Chile, for example, rather than locally, and to
provide teaching materials from central warehouses. This contains
perverse incentives that encourage short days, high drop-out rates,
and wastefulness. If total local school budgets are dependent on the
number of pupils in average daily attendance (ADA) times the number of
full days in the school year, plus some outcome-based performance in-
centives, this establishes the fund out of which teachers are paid and
materials are purchased, and sets up effective incentives to perform.
Furthermore, knowing the number of pupils in ADA, the local district
can then also objectively check the funds it receives against that
standard and thereby police the system.
To provide stronger commitment to student achievement, both pre-
testing and post testing is necessary. This does exist in many
countries already in the form of school leaving exams at the end of
primary and senior secondary schools. A commitment to outcome-based
instruction can be fostered throughout the system if the financial
incentives provided are tied to increments in these test scores (i.e.,
to value added) in basic science, language, social science, math, and
other key areas. Such incentives can be introduced into the school
aid formula in the form of pupil weightings. Although effective,
this is controversial, so in those countries where this step is not
feasible, the test score increments can be regarded as a refinement
for introduction later.
Equity can be increased by reducing the vast inequality in expen-
diture per pupil that currently exists as between rural and urban
areas and as between high and low income school districts. It is easy
to measure expenditure per pupil, so a measure of the current degree
of inequality using a Gini coefficient or other measure is relatively
easy to obtain. Such a measure was not computed however in any of the
education sector reviews for these Latin American nations in spite of
the fact that this measure of horizontal equity among pupils is
badly needed.
The most practical way to ensure that at least some minimal level
of equity is maintained is for the Central government to guarantee,
and provide for, a foundation level of expenditure per pupil. This
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represents a floor below which the level of education will not be
allowed to fall. This floor will be a larger percent of the total in
those countries where the financing system is most highly centralized,
and be a somewhat smaller but crucial percent of the average per pupil
expenditure in those countries where local financing assumes a propor-
tionately larger role.
To provide incentives for schools to not ignore the low income
children within their district, a targeting of an additional portion
of the grants to schools with a larger proportion of pupils in ADA
from low income families encourages the staff of the school to seek
out and try to retain such pupils. Where this is incorporated within
the school aid formula, it can be done by means of pupil weightings.
Any targeting of equalization grants by this or other means however
requires that Census data be available covering income per capita for
the local area, or else that some kind of a simple means test be used
to determine the number of disadvantaged children from low income
families that there are in a school district. This kind of a targeted
grant, or grant component, introduces an element of tax equity as well
since educational "effort" is usually larger as a percent of the tax
base in the low income, low wealth areas (e.g., McMahon, 1978).
Decentralization . The education systems in most of these Latin
American countries tend to be very highly centralized, except for
Brazil where there is considerable decentralization and Chile where
primary education was recently turned over to the municipalities.
There are inadequate incentives for local assistance with the financ-
ing, especially in the higher income areas. The problem is that
decentralization normally leads to great inequality in expenditure
per pupil, based on differences in wealth in the local areas. So it
is not conducive to equity that decentralization go too far, and any
decentralization must also include some centrally guaranteed founda-
tion expenditure levels per child to protect equity. At present how-
ever these are inadequate incentives through local decision making to
involve the parents, and in other ways to monitor the efficiency of
the local schools.
In Chile there has been administrative decentralization to the
municipalities of primary education and to private sector schools, but
the financing is still centralized. It will be interesting to see how
long it is before abuses crop up, given that there is not shared local
responsibility for financing. (See Chile, 1987, p. 30.) The local
school district needs to have authority for setting a local school tax
rate, based on the value of property, before there is any meaningful
participation in the responsibility for financing. Although higher
tuition and fees in higher education makes good sense, and in fact are
badly needed, the use of fees at the primary and junior secondary
level merely increases the drop-out and repetition rates. The
families of students in higher education have generally much higher
incomes and the ability to pay, and means-tested tuition and fee
waivers can be used at that level to avoid these adverse effects.
(See Part V below.) In contrast, given a goal of universal primary
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and lower secondary education, this requires very large numbers of
very poor people to send their children to school. A large fraction
of these families do not have the ability to pay fees in excess of the
foregone earnings costs they absorb. To use individualized means-
testing instruments to sort out those who do have the ability to pay
fees among large numbers of semi-literate parents while also ignoring
the foregone earnings costs is not realistic. The fees charged in
some countries at this level (enrollment fees, textbook fees, examina-
tion fees, etc.) tend also to ignore the large transportation costs
and uniform costs already borne by some parents, and therefore merely
cause high drop-out rates, especially in the rural areas.
To provide incentives for a degree of decentralization in
financing, and hence in decision making authority, a matching provi-
sion needs to be included in the school aid formula. By this means
any local property tax funds raised for the schools, usually expressed
in terms of the locally (or provincially) determined property tax rate
levied for education, are matched at least in part by incentive grants
from the central government. That is, all tax funds raised locally do
not lead to merely an equal retraction of central government support.
The latter provides a powerful disincentive that virtually precludes
all local participation in financing.
At the point where the degree of decentralization has gone just
far enough, there is a higher degree of local responsibility for
stewardship of the funds. The administration of teachers' salaries
needs to be more decentralized, even though most of the funds to pay
the teachers continues to come from the central government.
Although cost recovery by means of fees at the primary and junior
secondary level is not realistic, at the higher education level it is
badly needed, as indicated above. However, nothing has been said
about senior secondary schools. Clearly eliminating room and board
subsidies, and perhaps even charging some fees at this level in those
countries where senior secondary education is still far from uni-
versal, is appropriate.
A Model School Aid Formula and Its Properties
Since greater equity among pupils, rather than tax equity among
local taxing jurisdictions, is more important in these Latin American
and African systems where the financing is more centralized, a founda-
tion formula of the Strayer-Haig type rather than a resource-equalizer
formula is more relevant to the problems. Such a formula is shown in
Box 2. This formula then provides an objective means of allocating
resources among provinces and among schools that avoids favoritism and
avoids encouragement of dishonesty. It provides objectively for:
1) Equalization (F), or pupil equity, a floor below which the
level of education provided to each pupil , will not be allowed
to fall.
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Box 2
A Model School Aid Formula
The resources provided by the central government, R, for each
pupil in average daily attendance, ADA, contains a foundation level
,
F, for equity among districts and a public weighting Pe for equity
among pupils within districts
,
incentives for efficiency (i.e., ADA,
D, and Po) , and incentives for decentralization of financing (i.e.,
aTL, and T ) as follows:
(1) R/ADA = [F/ADA-aT(L/ADA)-B](Po+Pe+Pc)P
where:
R/ADA = Resources Provided by the Central Govt
,
per pupil in
Average Daily Attendance, times the number of full days
that school is in session, D,
F/ADA = Minimum Foundation Level Per Pupil, in ADA
L/ADA = Local Fiscal Capacity
,
measured as assessed value of urban
houses plus rural land within the local school district,
B fees collected from parents,
T the Tax Rate the Province allocates to the locality for
the schools, and that the locality augments and passes on
to the local schools. A minimum rate, T
,
can also be
required if the schools are to receive any aid from the
Central Government,
a = A constant indicating the extent to which the local tax
contribution to the schools reduces the contribution made
by the centrality, with < a < 1, and
P = Pupil Weightings
,
as described in the text.
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2) Incentives (ADA) to operate schools efficiently, with low drop-
out rates and by maintaining or increasing the tirae-on-task.
The number of full days (D) is also an incentive to increase
the time-on-task.
3) Incentives (P ) to improve quality (and efficiency), by use of
outcome-based instruction. P uses test score increments as a
pupil weighting.
4) Incentives (P e ) to increase equity, a pupil weighting based on
high concentration of poverty pupils.
5) Incentives (T ) to decentralize, and to make a local tax effort.
If T is a qualifying tax rate, this introduces a very strong
incentive to at least achieve this minimum local effort.
6) Incentives (aTL) to increase the local tax effort above the
qualifying tax rate level are provided by keeping "a" less than
unity. If a .8 for example, only 80 percent of the local
contribution is subtracted from the amount coming from the
central government, not 100 percent, providing an incentive to
do more than the minimum.
7) Tax equity (L) is included by introducing the local fiscal
capacity.
8) Phasing-In (P) of the formula can be accomplished by use of
another pupil weighting. This weighting can start at numbers
less than unity, and be increased gradually to unity (i.e.,
phased out) as the new formula allocations are phased in. That
is, P could be set initially so that the formula exactly
reproduces the current financial allocations. Then as the more
objective criteria and incentives contained in this formula are
brought to bear, this pupil weighting could be phased out.
There will also normally be additional mandates (e.g., to use a
particular textbook or to pay teachers more who have more education).
But most of the really important incentives are captured in the above
formula, and yet allow for local discretion as to how to achieve the
objectives.
As a result more decision making can be decentralized to the local
schools, who now have the incentives to achieve the eight objectives
listed above without so much regulation and delay. This is highly
conducive to achieving greater efficiency, because the bureaucratic
red tape and delays are reduced, and the local school committees can
take more initiative and responsibility in responding to specific
local problems. They have the incentives to be efficient and not
waste resources, and the local people have more incentive to take
action to support and to improve their local schools.
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Programming the Model School Aid Formula
Most of the items listed above are included in specific cells in
the cost analysis and LOTUS worksheet shown as Table 15 below. This
worksheet has been developed both as a basis for doing more adequate
cost analysis, and for use in adapting the formula to each country.
The primary education breakdown in Table 15 would be repeated at the
secondary level.
The formula given by equation (1) above can be programmed in LOTUS
for use on personal computers in each country using information
located in the specific cells of the Nationwide portion of the
worksheet shown in Table 15. The computerized formula on LOTUS is
shown in Box 3.
The formula can be applied to the data for each locality, insert-
ing the new cost analysis and local attendance data on the LOTUS
worksheet. Specific refinements need to be introduced for each
country. As simulations are run, the first step would be to compare
the amounts predicted by the model to the actual current allocations,
and to gradually phase in the formula by phasing out one of the pupil
weightings as P approaches unity.
Public Support of Private Schools . A completely separate school
aid formula is needed when it comes to private schools, since the
situation varies so widely.
In Chile, one approach that may warrant further study involves
straight per pupil in ADA grants to private providers who are encour-
aged to open schools in poor areas. Another successful example is in
Britain, where there have been public grants to private church schools
for many centuries at the primary and secondary level. But there are
also cautions, and things to be avoided, ranging from the promotion of
a class structure by this means, to the use of cost-based reimburse-
ment of private providers which has repeatedly proved disastrous to
achieving cost effectiveness. For example, third party reimbursement
of private health care providers in the U.S., and wasteful private
sector VOTEC schools in the U.S. that vary widely from very high to
very low quality are approaches to be avoided. Another potential
problem is that as children are withdrawn from the public schools to
attend parochial schools or other (sometimes racially "pure")
academies, it tends to lead to a withdrawal of financial support by
these parents from the public schools. The public schools then are
left with a low income clientele and deteriorating quality, as has
occurred in El Salvador.
Nevertheless, where the pitfalls indicated above are avoided,
there are many successful private schools in Latin America, many of
them Catholic.
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Box 3
Computerized School Aid Formula in LOTUS
Variable CELL Col. & Row (1986 data) in LOTUS :
R = Place Result produced by the formula in column
(Q-24) of Table 15, near the actual to be seen in
position (L-24).
ADA = (L-17), Table 15.
F = Foundation level set at .75 times nationwide mean
expenditure per pupil found in (L-18).
L = Assessed Value (L-49). Data must be collected with
the help of the Ministry of Finance.
a = .8, a constant. There is a policy decision here , in
that raising above .8 lowers the incentive for the
Provincial and Local government to support the
schools.
T = .03, a constant minimum education tax millage rate,
T , to start with. This is a policy decision that
must be made as to where the floor is to be. As a
larger local tax effort is made, T would rise.
B = Fees, Cell (L-43) in Table 1.
P = Increments to test scores obtained from pre-testing
and post testing. P = in those situations where
these test score increments are not available.
P = Pupil weighting based on concentration of poverty
pupils. Pe = in cases where this data is not
available.
P = Ratio of Av. Exp/Pupil ADA in Primary Educ. to
National Average Expenditure per Pupil, at all
levels, i.e., (L-18): (L18 + L54 + L86 + L118 + L150
+ L181 + L213).
P = Phase-in weights. This pupil weighting can be varied
also for purposes of simulation studies.
The LOTUS program for the Model School aid formula is:
(2) (Q24) = [,75(L18)/(L17) - ( .03) .8(L49)/(L17)-(L43)
]
[(L-50) + (L51) + (L18)/(L18 + L54 + L86 + L118 + L150 + L181 + L213]P
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V. Equity and Efficiency in Higher Education
The financing of higher education is the source of a great deal
of inefficiency and also inequity in most of these nations in Latin
America. This is evident as was indicated earlier in the extremely
high cost per student relative to basic education, reflecting internal
inefficiency, the low rates of return to higher relative to basic edu-
cation reflecting external inefficiency, and often over 60% of the
benefits of public higher education going to the children from the
highest income group reflecting inequity. The failure to target
public services to the poor is probably worse in higher education than
in any other sector.
The policy changes needed are:
1. Tuition and fee increases
,
to cover 33% or more of institu-
tional costs (needed in all countries except Chile),
2. Targeting of tuition and fee waivers
,
access to loans, and
work-study, by requiring that an income criterion be imposed
for eligibility (needed in all countries),
3. Use of part-time graduate student teaching and research
assistants both to reduce costs and to diffuse technology.
4. Responsibility for student placement at the college and uni-
versity level to improve communication with job markets, and
5. Incentive schemes based on outcome-based instruction and
outcome-based university performed research.
Tuition and Fee Increases
There is a large and relatively untapped potential for financing
the continuing expansion of higher education in these and other Latin
American countries by means of resource recovery from those who have
the ability to pay. An objective system for targeting of the subsidies
to those who need them, rather than those who do not, requires a more
refined family financial need analysis statement and computerized pro-
cedure than is in use in any of these countries at present. It is the
reasons for this, and the specific methods of accomplishing it that
are the primary focus of the remainder of this section.
Tuition, fee, and room and board subsidies should be implemented
by gradual annual increments rather than by discrete large jumps to
avoid the conflict that otherwise ensues. "Grandfather clauses" are
also a useful tool to avoid destroying the expectations of current
students that produces these reactions. With three to four years to
phase in the changes, a gradual improvement in the targeting not only
of the remaining tuition and fee waivers but also of student loans
(which usually are subsidized) and of work-study opportunities can be
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impleraented by means of a Family Financial Statement filled out by the
parents and processed by a computer in a centralized location. The
cost of this is extremely low, considering the benefits to greatly
improved targeting, reduced "leakage" through greater objectivity,
and increased efficiency in retaining access for the nation's pool of
able students from poor families. The administrative costs for $3.6
billion of U.S. Pell Grants in 1985 were only 4.2% of the benefits,
much of which is covered by the $7.00 fee (in 1989) paid by the
parents who are applying for tuition and fee or room and board aid
(see Jiminez, 1989, Table 3, p. 55).
The alternative to doing this merely drives out the students from
low income families as occurred in Chile where a 14% enrollment reduc-
tion occurred following about a 25% reduction in higher education
subsidies. This was in spite of the fact that a student loan program
was implemented (see Table 14 above and Chile, 1987, p. 32.).
Student loans are a help, but they are only one part of a stu-
dent's financial aid package which should also include tuition and fee
waivers
,
fellowship grants
,
and work-study . All of these can and
should be means-tested in one step. Reports based on objective
analysis of one Family Financial Statement are sent to each campus at
which the student applies to be used to means-test each component of
the aid package. So the financial need analysis needs to be done only
once, and can then serve to means-test all sources of aid.
If loans are the only source, and there are no tuition and fee
waivers or other student aids, the students from poor families must
borrow very heavily. This constitutes a substantial deterrent. If
the students largely from high income families who do enroll are less
talented or less motivated than those who are too poor to attend, the
selection of students is inefficient. In Columbia, for example, 54%
of the first-year students in higher education scored lower on apti-
tude tests than the corresponding cohort of secondary school graduates
that did not enroll. (See World Bank, 1986, p. 12.)
In Jamaica, the World Bank required a policy to improve student
aid as an offset to the impact on the poor of recent increases in stu-
dent fees (see Jamaica, 1987). But this is the only Latin American
country to date where this has been done. (See Jiminez, 1989, Table
6a, p. 59.) And no tuition and fee waivers were provided, or no
income criterion was imposed for eligibility. Similarly in Chile, as
mentioned above, no income criterion was imposed and coherent compre-
hensive student aid packages were not set up. Similarly, a student
loan scheme has been required as a part of fee increases in Senegal,
Malawi, Zaire, Ghana, Korea, and Indonesia. But again no income
criterion or more comprehensive student aid package was required. In
the recent World Bank loan to Morocco, the education sector loan
requires an increase in fees, and that there be an "income criterion
for fellowship eligibility." (See Jiminez, 1989, Table 6a, p. 59.)
It is this requirement that should accompany higher education resource
recovery requirements in all future World Bank education sector loans.
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In Costa Rica, for example, 70% of the students have scholarships
although three-fourths of them come from the upper two quintiles of
the income distribution. (See Costa Rica, 1989, p. 11.) At the same
time, these scholarships cover only tuition in part, and not housing,
food, or other maintenance costs, so they do not allow students from
poorer economic backgrounds to attend the university.
A Specific Family Financial Statement Prototype Tool
A model Family Financial Statement for collecting the necessary
financial information to determine the "parents' expected contribu-
tion" is shown in Box 4. It reflects conditions found in these Latin
American countries, although it has been adapted from one devised for
Indonesia (see McMahon, 1988, pp. 142-3) and could easily be adapted
for use in other developing countries.
The conditions it reflects are those of a relatively larger rural
sector than that in the industrial countries where these types of
instruments are widely used in the financing of higher education (see
Johnstone, 1986, for an excellent survey). The form may be thought of
as illustrated for Brazil, where only 5% of higher education costs are
recovered by fees. There a military dictatorship that was in power
until after 1984 put large amounts into high cost courses that sup-
ported technology and military needs, and past traditions there use a
non-objective system more open to personal favoritism. (Also Brazil's
total public education budget is only 2.96% of GNP , the lowest in
Latin America (Table 2) with relatively little support for primary
education in the rural areas.) Fewer pay income tax and the extended
family has a more important role.
The form must be filled in by the parent, not the student, who has
access to records and knows his or her income and assets. It must be
countersigned by the student, which emphasizes the shared responsi-
bility for financing and helps the system to be self-enforcing. The
form emphasizes that it is an application for financial aid, although
of course it is really a self-assessment. It leads up to a "parents'
expected contribution" later which will be a matter between the
parents and their child, and there is no tax collector involved. The
form is not a mark-sensed form because most parents in Latin American
countries are not likely to be familiar with these. But the cost of
clerical labor to transform the data onto a personal computer file
would be relatively low, and mark-sensed forms also could be used
where that is desirable.
Demographic Information as a Basis for
Parental Living Allowance Deductions
No questions are asked on this form except the one about financial
assets (on which there has been quite a bit of research by Robert
Ferber) that are not either self-veryifying in the sense that their
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Box 4
Application for Financial Aid And Family Financial Statement
A Prototype Tool Needed for Better Targeting
To be filled in by the parent of a student seeking financial aid . Mail to
(a private firm such as American College Testing),* for processing.
Warning ; All information is subject to verification. If you purposely give
false or misleading information to establish eligibility for student aid,
you can be fined, receive a prison sentence, or both.*
1. What university does your son or daughter plan to attend, or
attend now?
2. Student son or daughter's name:
3. Parent's name filling out this form:
4. Parent's home mailing address:
Number Street City Province
5. Student's next year in college: Freshman 2nd 3rd
4th 5th
6. Parents' marital status: Married Divorced Father Deceased
7. Age of the older parent is years.
8. Number of family members that you support:
a. Number of your children that will be receiving over one-half of
their support from you next year (include the student):
College Name and City
Last First Middle
Last First Middle
b. Number of other family members to be living at home and receiving
one-half of their support from you. Include elderly parents,
grandchildren, and other family members here:
c. Number of children of those included in question 8a to be away at
a boarding school or college next year:
9. Do you have a tax number? Yes No. If so, what is it?
(If you did not file a tax form last year, skip the
next section, and go to the family financial infor- Tax Number
mation section beginning with question 14.)
PARENTS' FINANCIAL STATEMENT
Please refer to your most recent (Tax Form) to complete the next few
questions:
10. What is the total income of your family for the year just ended re-
ported on line of your (Tax Form)?
(This includes your wife's income, and that of other family members
living with you who work.)
11. What are your total assets reported on line of your (Tax Form)?
12. How much tax did you pay, based on this tax form?
*For illustrative purposes only. This is the practice in the United States.
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13. What are the specific assets reported on line of your tax form?
Value Now Amount Owed
Parents' home Home Mortgage
Financial assets and investments Other bank debt
Other real estate, business,
or farm
14. What kind of a house do you have?
Brick house
Half brick
Wood or stone
15. How many hectares do you own, if any? (Insert here number recorded at
the Province level for the property tax) : hectares
16. What is your occupation?
17. Do you have: Horses? Tractors?
Electricity at home? A car?
A color TV? A telephone at home?
18. How many years of basic education have you completed?
Of College?
STUDENT INFORMATION
19. With whom will you live next year while in college?
(a) At home with parents (if parents live near enough to the
college)
(b) College dormitory or rented room
(c) A brother, uncle, or other relative
(If you answered 19(a) or 19(b), skip the next section and go to question 22.)
INFORMATION ABOUT RELATIVE WITH WHOM YOU WILL LIVE
20. What is the name and address of this brother or other relative with
whom you will live?
Name Address
21. Does this member of your extended family have a tax number?
Yes No If so, what is it?
22. Approximately how much tax did he pay?
None Rp. Don't Know
23. What is his occupation?
What is his rank (if in the military, or civil service)?
24. Approximately what is his income?
CERTIFICATION AND SIGNATURES
I certify that the information on this form is complete and correct. If
necessary for verification, I permit an authorized official to make in-
quiries, and agree to send a xerox copy of ray last Tax Form if asked. I do
realize that if I don't respond to the request for proof when asked, the
student will not receive financial aid.
At least one parent must sign:
Parent's Signature Date
Student must also sign:
Student's Signature Date
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answers are readily observable to the student or others who know the
family, or else that could not be verified should the need arise.
This simple principle encourages honesty.
The identifying information in questions 1-5 provide the family
and college financial aid officer addresses to which the results con-
taining the parents' expected contribution and the results of the
financial aid awarded can be mailed. The demographic information in
questions 6-8 provide the basis for computer calculations described
later that set aside parents' living and retirement allowances.
Income and Assets for Those Who File
Tax Forms (Questions 9-13)
If the country issues a tax (or social security) number it usually
means that the parent is employed as a civil servant or by a private
firm. Income information is requested from a specific line of the tax
form that must be filed (Q. 10), which increases the accuracy with
which it is reported and permits verification later. It includes the
income from "second jobs," the wife's income, and the income of other
family members. Assets are reported on another page (Q. 11-12), and
also could be verified if the form is selected for auditing. This in-
formation therefore piggy-backs on the enforcement by the Ministry of
Finance of the nation's tax laws.
Estimating Income and Wealth for Those
Who Do Not File Tax Forms
Questions 14-18 that follow get away from using the favoritism-
ridden subjective practice frequently used of asking the student or
neighborhood leader to report the parents' income or wealth.
Questions 14-18 are for those who do not file tax forms, many of
whom are in rural villages where non-market aspects of the economy
loom more important. Occupation and education can be used for esti-
mating income. The national labor force surveys collect detailed in-
formation on income from a large sample of persons in all provinces
that can be used for imputing income and for checking returns for
reasonableness. Questions 14, 17, and 18 about the kind of home,
electrification, cars, and TV are similar cross-checks.
Questions 19 and 20 ask whether the student will live at home or
with a relative. If so, living cost subsidies are not needed. If the
brother or uncle has high income as revealed by questions 21-23, a
student tuition loan without a tuition waiver might be more appro-
priate.
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Criteria for Computing the Family's Expected Contribution
The parents' expected contribution can be computed based on this
information about the parents' income and net assets, and the income
of any supportive member of the extended family. The computer must be
programmed to deduct a standard maintenance allowance for the parents
from the income of the parents and their other dependents, as well as
setting aside a retirement allowance from net assets for the parents.
The Standard Maintenance Allowance is based on national surveys of
consumption resulting in a cost estimate for families with specific
numbers of dependents. It must be adjusted annually by a consumer
price index to reflect the inflation rate expected in the upcoming
year. Available income is total family income less this allowance.
It is the discretionary income available for supporting the family's
living standard above the standard level as well as for financing the
higher education of the children.
Wealth . The treatment of the parents' assets within the computer
program must first subtract the debt reported on the form to obtain
net worth. Then a fraction of the net value of the home and other
assets are protected to provide for the parents' retirement. The
fraction increases with the age of the eldest parent. The formula
for the amount of assets set aside is based on the current cost of an
annuity that would provide the parents a moderate level of living
throughout their retirement years. Future inflation must be built
into this formula using the inflation rate specific to each country.
An allowance also needs to be made for social security where a social
security program exists. Life expectancy data can be obtained from
the World Bank's World Development Report (1989) statistical appendix
for each country. The annuity formula used by the ACT Uniform
Methodology ignoring loading charges is:
A - M(l+p)< L+n >' 2 (
[l-a+r*> n
'L
] )a+r*rn
A = asset protection allowance,
M = moderate budget for a retired couple,
p = expected average annual rate of inflation,
L = life expectancy, less current age (from form),
n = retirement age, less current age (from form),
r* = rate of return on the annuity.
The resulting asset protection allowance which depends on the parents'
age can also be stored in the computer, and is deducted from total
assets to obtain "Discretionary Net Worth."
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Finally
,
the parents' expected contribution is computed by adding
discretionary net worth and the parents' available income, and apply-
ing a suitable tax rate (see McMahon, 1988, p. 146). The student's
unmet need is calculated by subtracting this amount from the tuition,
fee, room, and board costs at the college of his choice. It is only
this parents' expected contribution and unmet need totals that are
sent to the campus financial aid officer for use in administering
tuition and fee waivers, maintenance fellowships, student loans, and
work-study.
VI. Conclusions
Tables 1 through 15 and the theme elements that they support sug-
gest a framework for collecting consistent data in the countries in
which items are missing, as well as providing a framework for extend-
ing the analysis to other countries in the region. For more rigorous
social scientific analysis it is important that consistent data be
collected in all of the countries covering the key items.
It is concluded that there has been a deterioration in the quality
of education following relatively large reductions in real per capita
expenditure on education from 1980-85, expenditure cuts that ranged up
to 32-71% in five of these Latin American countries. There has been
some recovery in investment in education in Jamaica and Brazil, but
further deterioration in the other countries since that time. Some
limited evidence suggests that there was also a reduction in efficiency
as expenditures were cut. It is clear that the economic decline led
to greater inequity within education, with a disproportionate burden
on the poor.
Many policy options were suggested for increasing efficiency and
equity in investment strategies and improving the incentives for ef-
ficiency within both basic and higher education. The Bank needs to
examine its own investment policies to be sure that it is not encour-
aging inefficient strategies, e.g., too much invested in higher edu-
cation, or in separately tracked VOTEC schools, or in physical capital,
and too little in the primary and secondary levels, texts, and teach-
ing materials where the rates of return and cost effectiveness often
are higher. Loan conditions also need to require more effective
targeting. Finally, two specific "prototype tools" are suggested for
potential further development and use in improving efficiency and
equity in the financing of basic education and in the financing of
higher education.
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